The Riddle Of The Sphinx
By Hani Kobrossi
02/02/2011
Two words. Suez and Canal. In fact three; Suez, Canal and Israel. The constant stream of journalists lavishing unbounded praise and seemingly heartfelt admiration on Tunisians and Egyptians (as well as the broader “restless Arab street”) may yet end in cringeworthy backtracking.
There is no doubt that the uprising of those oppressed for so many years at the hands of corrupt, Western-placed dynasties is a good thing. There is also no denying that the poverty that exists across the greater part of the Levant and North Africa, for the benefit of the incredibly wealthy few, is a direct result of years of preferential treatment to those willing to acquiesce to the perceived greater good (for ‘greater good’ read: smooth transportation of affordable oil). Without pretending to be a deeply-knowledgeable expert on all things Egyptian (as so many news reporters suddenly appear to be), it doesn’t take a genius to sit back and wonder where exactly all this popular uprising may go. The problem is that this may all end in tears again. A la Iran.
Back in 1979, the world first greeted the Iranian revolution with a sense of admiration that a country’s people were taking it upon themselves to determine their future. And yet the internal dissatisfaction with the Shah erupted and resulted in what is, ominously still today, a bewildering move towards Islamic fundamentalism.
What happened there you ask? A simply answer really: human nature. In extreme cases of uncertainty the many will be moved by the few. Fear leads to impulsive decisions and is as such the politician’s best friend. The excitement of revolution is not always one of elation but rather an adrenaline-fuelled fear of the unknown - like sitting at a Vegas roulette table with a million Dollars on black while those ten…nine…eight…seven unbearably frightening (exciting?) seconds of wheel-spinning-ball-bouncing tick by. If someone came to you halfway through the spin and suggested you escape with half your winnings, would you listen? That is the issue here. Will the people of Egypt really get what they want at the end of this saga? Or will an exceedingly tactful and well-timed extremist leadership take advantage of a power vacuum and appeal to the short-term sensibilities of the masses? Iran in 1978 didn’t think Khomeini would be their leader in 1979. Whom are the Egyptians hoping for as their leader in 2012?
Ah, I hear you say, but mass media and the internet have changed everything. The world we live in is vastly different from 1979. The people of Egypt are more savvy, technology and social awareness have seen to that. That may well be, but the power of the individual to rally an entire group of bewildered, poverty-stricken protesters is arguably more potent than any amount of Twittering. The average shop-keeper on the streets of Cairo doesn’t update his Tweet via his iPhone. No, he’s more interested in finding out where tomorrow’s trade is coming from to feed his family. As loud as the voice of the crowd is today via mass communication, the power and eloquence of the individual’s rallying-cry echoes as vividly as ever above a cacophony.
Don’t be fooled by the naïve and hysterical “we-sense-a-24-hour-coverage-bonanza” media coverage. Read the history books and analyse the Arab street for yourself. Speak to people who have lived through such revolutions. Even Lebanon’s revolt against Syrian intervention in 2006 resulted in some then unforeseen ramifications. Revolution can open the door to extremism. Only calm, controlled discussions will bring about the lasting sense of justice that so many around the Middle East seek.
So what next? Whoever ends up as Egypt’s (hopefully democratically elected) leader will inherit control of one of the world’s most important shipping conduits. The world has gone to war before over the Suez Canal, no one can be sure it will not again. Will Egypt place as much importance on foreign policy as the international community would like it to? Of course any predictions are mere speculation, but the possibilities are there:
1. Probable: Mohammed El-Baradei is elected leader in a democratic election and attempts to maintain most of what the West perceive as a desirable status quo with Israel and its allies. Egyptians are temporarily placated by winning their right-to-vote and have it counted, but the issue of poverty does not disappear overnight.
2. Hopefully Not: An international peace-keeping force is sent in under the auspices of maintaining an open and free trading route via the Suez Canal. Low-level protests and general discontent continue for several inconclusive years.
3. Far-fetched but not unprecedented: Mubarak clings on and brings bloodshed and chaos to a country otherwise interested in moving onwards commercially and economically. The Muslim Brotherhood sense their opportunity and call for a total revolution. If this succeeds Israel must consider an invasion.
The troubles in Egypt might reflect a growing and dangerous dissatisfaction with the ineffectual “leadership” within the always volatile Middle East (history has a nasty way of repeating itself over thousands and thousands of years, just ask the Mesopotamians and Byzantines) but what we are seeing today is more a result of what some inwardly critical geopolitical commentators have correctly cited as “immature Western policy”. One only hopes that this generation’s governing powers read their history books.